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I. INTRODUCTION

Renewed interest in statutory interpretation has generated a plethora of
different suggestions about how best to discern legislative meaning
through the use of interpretive rules or "canons."' The creation and
employment of canons is not a new phenomenon; courts have long relied
on interpretive shortcuts to help orient the inquiry into statutory meaning
and legislative intent.' However, the last half-century or so has witnessed a
growth in the use of canons of statutory construction to implement
substantive values and to attempt to bring about improvements in the
legislative process. 3 Indeed, many of the more controversial canonsand, to add to this, the use of traditional canons in more controversial
ways--can be explained and justified only on the grounds that courts are
wise to use interpretive rules to implement desirable results under the
rubric of statutory interpretation.
Karl Llewellyn reminded us a half century ago that these canons can
be manipulated through careful judicial technique to reach a desired
result;4 and, more recently, scholars of various political stripes have
defended and attacked certain canons on the grounds that they mask
outcome-oriented jurisprudence. 5 While much of this literature zeroes in
on particular interpretive rules, we ask the more general question: What
are we to make of the whole enterprise of canonical statutory construction
in modem American law?
1.
See, e.g., James Brudney & Corey Distlear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2004); John Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003); Einer Elhauge, PreferenceEliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002); PreferenceEstimatingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).
2.
See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819); United
States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1235 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809); Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Company, 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (absurdity canon); Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (the non-retroactivity of statutes); Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, 109 S.Ct. 1676, 1683-84 & n.5 (1989) (expressio unius canon).
3.
See the discussion in WLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405 (1989).
4.
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
5.
See, e.g., Manning, Absurdity, supra note 1; Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203 (1990).
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To determine whether such approaches are normatively appealing, we
must examine directly and rigorously the logic and architecture of the
canons. To the extent that canons of statutory interpretation rest
ultimately on assumptions about, and theories of, the legislative process,
the case for canonical construction stands or falls on the plausibility of
these assumptions and theories. We support this observation by close
attention to one particular interpretive canon: the canon disfavoring
legislative changes through the appropriations process. This canon
provides an instruction to the courts to narrowly construe legislative
changes to substantive authorization statutes where such changes are
made through the appropriations process.
We argue that this canon rests on an impoverished analysis of the
appropriations process and is, therefore, unjustified as a matter of
positive political theory. And without a grounding in a sensible theory
of legislation it lacks any plausible normative foundation.
More
generally, this ill-advised canon sheds light on the mistakes courts
commonly make in fashioning canons whose rationale and function are
untethered to a compelling normative and positive theory of the
legislative process.
To frame our argument, we begin with an interesting, though ultimately
unremarkable, case in which the court applied this canon. In 1991,
Congress passed a statute entitled the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act authorizing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
establish a single national database of individuals who object to
receiving telephone solicitations. 6 For reasons presumably well known
to the agency and its legislative benefactors, the FCC declined to create
this so-called national "do-not-call" list; instead the FCC decided to
adopt its own specialized do-not-call lists.7 In what must have been
muzak to the ears of the prisoners, third-world sweatshops, and the
telemarketing industry, the FCC declared that individuals would like to
maintain their ability to choose among those telemarketers from whom
they do and do not want to hear.8 Under the FCC's system, if a telemarketer
calls a consumer, the consumer can request that the telemarketer remove
6.
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)).
7.

See

IN THE MATTER

OF RULES

AND

REGULATIONS

IMPLEMENTING

THE

TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 (Oct. 16, 1992), at 9, para. 14.
8.
See id. at 10, para. 15. Moreover, declared the FCC, a nationwide do-not-call
list was "not an efficient, effective, or economic means of avoiding unwanted telephone
solicitations." Id.

his or her telephone number from the telemarketer's list.
Undaunted, Congress enacted the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud
and Abuse Prevention Act (TCFAP) in 1994 and charged a different
agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), with the responsibility to
enact "rules prohibiting ... abusive telemarketing acts or practices." 9
However, the act did not apply to organizations not regulated by the
FTC, which includes "certain financial institutions, common carriers, air
carriers and nonprofit organizations or to insurance companies ...
regulated by state law."' 0 Subsequently, the FTC took action as directed
by Congress and created the Telemarketing Sales Rule in order to
combat abusive telemarketing practices."1 In January 2002, the FTC
underwent the process of amending the rules in order to create a
nationwide do-not-call list. By June 2003, the do-not-call list was ready
for public registration. Telemarketers, of course, filed suit to block the
list.
In US. Security, et al v. Federal Trade Commission,1 2 telemarketers
claimed that Congress did not give an unambiguous grant of authority to
the FTC necessary to enforce the do-not-call list. The district court
agreed with the telemarketers and invalidated the FTC regulation.1 3 In
supporting his decision in the Oklahoma case, U.S. District Judge Lewis
West noted that Congress was silent on the precise issue of whether the
FTC possesses the authority to create a national do-not-call list and,
therefore, Congress did not intend to give the agency this authority. The
court conceded that "Congress expressly granted the authority to the
FCC under the TCPA to establish and operate" a national do-not-call
list. Congress also "charged the FTC under the TCFAP with the
authority" to prevent abusive and deceptive telemarketing practices. 4
However, Judge West concluded that "the TCFAP is silent as to the
FTC's authority to promulgate a do-not-call registry ' ' 5 (emphasis
added). It was then clear to Judge West that Congress did not grant the
authority to the FTC necessary to establish the do-not-call list.1 6 Judge

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108.
10.
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45, 6105(a).
11.
See the description in U.S. Security, et al. v. Federal Trade Comm 'n, No. CIV03-122-W (Sept. 23, 2003), at 5-8.
12. No. CIV-03-122-W (W. Dist. Ok.) (9/23/03).
13.
Id.
14. Id. at 11.
15.
Id.
16. The FTC urged that under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), "'[d]eference.. to [the] agency's construction of a
statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity [or silence]
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory
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West based his logic on the precedent in the American Bus Association
decision17 , stating that "Congress' failure to grant an agency a given
power is not an ambiguity as to whether that power has, in fact, been
granted... [A] statutory silence on the granting of a power is a denial of
that power to the agency."' 8
Whether or not one agrees with the interpretation of the sounds of
congressional silence in American Bus, Congress could not have rung
the bell more loudly. Indeed, Congress, in enacting legislation granting
appropriations to the FTC to implement TCFAP, specifically authorized
the agency to use, as part of its funding for the registry, money derived
from "fees sufficient to implement and enforce the do-not-call
provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule." 9 Lest anyone would
mistake their intentions, Congress labeled this piece of legislation the
"Do-Not-Call Implementation Act."2
Asked to interpret TCFAP, the district court ignored what would seem
to be the interpretation of legislative will most in accord with common
sense: Congress had authorized FTC in 1994 to do essentially the same
thing as it had (unsuccessfully) charged the FCC to do three years
earlier. Moreover, Congress reaffirmed this intent in 2003 when it
enacted two separate appropriations laws that specifically referred to the
FTC's project, then well underway, of establishing and funding a
national "do-not-call" list.2 1 Therefore, in its defense, the FTC relied
upon the theory that since tax dollars were appropriated to the agency for
the implementation of the do-not-call list, Congress had conferred the
appropriate power to the agency.
However, Judge West invoked a canon of statutory interpretation to
temper the impact of these congressional decisions. The canon, created
by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,22 disfavors
congressional changes in substantive legislation through the appropriations

gaps."' To Judge West, the flaw with this contention rested on the fact that half of this
"implicit delegation" was given to the FCC under the TCPA, not the FTC.
17.
Am. Bus. Ass'n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sentelle, J.,

concurring).
18.
Id. at 13.
19. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-07, 117 Stat. 11
(2003) and the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557
(2003).
20.
21.
22.

Pub.L. No. 108-10 (Mar. 11, 2003).
See Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-07 (Feb. 20, 2003).
437 U.S. 153 (1978).

process. The presumption is that Congress did not intend, by its
decision in the appropriations process, to alter the authorizing statute.
Rather, as the district court says in U.S. Security, "the appropriation
must plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority which is
claimed."23 The TVA Court grounded this presumption in the logic of
the hoary rule that "repeals by implication are not favored."24 This rule,
said the Court, "applies with full vigor when ...the subsequent legislation

is an appropriations measure."25
Rejecting a clear statement of congressional intent in a case where it is
exactly the will of Congress that is in question is a peculiar choice to
make.26 However, this move is characteristic of courts struggling and
straining to invent and apply increasingly opaque and convoluted canons
of statutory construction to take the place of a fair, informed appraisal of
legislative intent."
Liberals and conservatives are both to blame for this mess. In recent
years, judicial conservatives champion an approach to statutory interpretation
labeled "textualism," that is, fidelity to the so-called plain meaning of
legislation. 28 Unfortunately, words enacted into law by 535 opinionated
legislators, plus the president, require interpretation and the exercise of
careful judgment. Where, as here, the statute does not specifically say
"FTC, you may (or may not) enact a national do-not-call list," informed
judgment is called upon to discern what authority Congress intended the
agency to have. Slavish devotion to the purportedly "plain meaning" of
the TCFAP does not provide a ready answer. At the other end of the
political spectrum, courts are told to eschew the "dead hand" of the past
and instead to prefer more "progressive" approaches to interpreting

23.

See U.S. Security, supra note 11, at 14 (quoting Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323

U.S. 283, 303 n.24 (1944).
24. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 189-90.
25.
Id.
26. In addition, Congress immediately took action by passing legislation allowing
for the national do-not-call registry, effectively rendering moot federal judge's injunction
against registry which had been granted to the telemarketers in U.S. Security v. F. T.C.
Within forty-eight hours, Congress drafted this legislation specifically authorizing the
FTC to promulgate the do-not-call list. As if there was really any doubt about
congressional intent, the bill passed 95-0 in the Senate and 412-8 in the House. Some
lawmakers deemed it the "This Time We Really Mean It Act." The purpose of the bill
was to give the FTC power to carry forward with the do-not-call list, and especially cure
any judicial misunderstanding.
27. See supra text accompanying note 2.
28. See, e.g., John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 673 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rrv.
621 (1990).
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legislation over approaches that follow the real will of the legislature.29
The do-not-call registry episode illustrates the ways in which courts
confound the legislative process through their fidelity to various rules of
statutory interpretation. Canonical construction of the sort represented
by Judge West's opinion in US. Security rests on a series of questionable
assumptions about legislative behavior and performance. Too, canons
such as the appropriations canon are dubious as a matter of constitutional
logic as well. The fault lies, of course, not with Judge West's application of
this canon in this particular case but, rather, with the development of
canon by the Supreme Court, with the thin efforts of scholars to explain
and justify this canon and, ultimately, with the failure of courts and
commentators to ground canonical construction in a sensible and
sophisticated theory of lawmaking and of American constitutionalism.
Our objective in this article is to reflect upon this failure and, more
generally, upon the broad themes which animate the modem debate
about statutory interpretation. We do this by focusing closely upon one
canon of construction. While perhaps unremarkable in the pantheon of
interpretive canons, the appropriations canon illustrates well our
principal objections to the theoretically and empirically unsustainable
approach to legislative interpretation reflected in cases such as U.S.
Security.
The article proceeds as follows: In the next part, we look at the origins
and logic of the appropriations canon, focusing both on the rationales
advanced for its use and also by the related rationales for processperfecting canonical construction more generally. We call into question
the assumptions upon which this approach is based and, thereby, the
rationale for the canon. In Part III, we offer reasons for an approach to
interpreting appropriations legislation that is opposed to the traditional
approach, explaining how our approach fits better with a sound theory of
the performance of Congress and with the constitutional structure of
lawmaking. Lastly, in Part IV, we draw from this consideration of the
appropriations canon some lessons for the modem statutory interpretation
debate.

29.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989).

II. THE APPROPRIATIONS CANON
A. The Canon's Origins
The appropriations canon was established by the Supreme Court in
TVA v. Hill;3" it was reaffirmed plainly fourteen years later in Robertson
v. Seattle Audubon Society.3 To understand the structure and rationale
of the canon-and, indeed, to understand its flaws-it is important to be
familiar with the legislative history that underlies the Court's canonical
construction in these two cases. We turn first to TVA, often labeled the
"snail darter" case.
The story of the controversial Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project
began in 1967, more than a decade before the Supreme Court rendered
its decision in TVA. Congress appropriated funds for the development of
this multipurpose regional development project, a project that included a
dam to be placed on the Little Tennessee River.32 From the very
beginning, the Tellico Dam project was ensnared in lawsuits. One major
lawsuit involved a claim that the dam violated the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) of 1973. 3 The claim, not seriously disputed by the respondents
in the TVA litigation, was that the dam would imperil the critical habitat
of the snail darter (a fish, not a mollusk), a species endangered within
the clear terms of the ESA.
Among the arguments made by the respondents in this litigation was
that Congress had enacted legislation after the ESA, which essentially
removed the Tellico Dam project from the prohibitions of the
environmental statute.34 This legislation was not an amendment to the
ESA per se; nor was it a specific repeal of that act. Rather, so the
argument goes, the congressional decisions to continue to appropriate
funds for the building of the Tellico Dam constitutes an implied repeal
of the ESA to the extent that it applies to the dam project.3 5
The labyrinthine process by which Congress considered whether and
how to proceed with the construction of the Tellico Dam, notwithstanding
the enactment of the ESA, is described in detail by the Chief Justice
Burger in his opinion for the Court in TVA:

30. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
31.
503 U.S. 429 (1992).
32.
See generally Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 808
(Tenn.1972).
33.
16 U.S.C. § 1536 etseq.
34. See infra text accompanying note 37.
35.
See infra text accompanying note 38.

676
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... Congress had also become involved in the fate of the snail darter. Appearing
before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in April
1975-some seven months before the snail darter was listed as endangered-TVA
representatives described the discovery of the fish and the relevance of the
Endangered Species Act to the Tellico Project. (citations omitted). At that time
TVA presented a position which it would advance in successive forums thereafter,
namely, that the Act did not prohibit the completion of a project authorized,
funded, and substantially constructed before the Act was passed. TVA also
described its efforts to transplant the snail darter, but contended that the dam
should be finished regardless of the experiment's success. Thereafter, the House
Committee on Appropriations, in its June 20, 1975, Report, stated the following in
the course of recommending that an additional $ 29 million be appropriated for
Tellico:
"The Committee directs that the project, for which an environmental impact
statement has been completed and provided the Committee, should be
completed as promptly as possible .. " H. R. Rep. No. 94-319, p. 76 (1975).
(Emphasis added.) Congress then approved the TVA general budget, which
contained funds for continued construction of the Tellico Project. (TVA
projects generally are authorized by the Authority itself and are fundedwithout the need for specific congressional authorization-from lump-sum
appropriations provided in yearly budget grants. (citations omitted) In
December 1975, one month after the snail darter was declared an endangered
species, the President signed the bill into law. (citations omitted).
In February 1976, pursuant to § 11 (g) of the Endangered Species Act, 87
Stat. 900, 16 U. S. C. § 1540 (g) (1976 ed.),... respondents filed the case now
under review, seeking to enjoin completion of the dam and impoundment of
the reservoir on the ground that those actions would violate the Act by directly
causing the extinction of the species Percina (Imostoma) tanasi. The District
Court denied respondents' request for a preliminary injunction and set the
matter for trial. Shortly thereafter the House and Senate held appropriations
hearings which would include discussions of the Tellico budget.
At these hearings, TVA Chairman Wagner reiterated the agency's position
that the Act did not apply to a project which was over 50% finished by the time
the Act became effective and some 70% to 80% complete when the snail darter
was officially listed as endangered. It also notified the Committees of the
recently filed lawsuit's status and reported that TVA's efforts to transplant the
snail darter had "been very encouraging" (citations omitted).
.. [T]he District Court stressed that the entire project was then about 80%
complete and, based on available evidence, "there [were] no alternatives to
impoundment of the reservoir, short of scrapping the entire project." . . . The
court also noted that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 was passed some
seven years after construction on the dam commenced and that Congress had
continued appropriations for Tellico, with full awareness of the snail darter
problem.... Where there has been an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of

resources by Congress to a project over a span of almost a decade, the Court
should proceed with a great deal of circumspection."
... To accept the plaintiffs' position, the District Court argued, would
inexorably lead to what it characterized as the absurd result of requiring "a
court to halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam if an
endangered species were discovered in the river on the day before such
impoundment was scheduled
to take place. We cannot conceive that Congress
36
intended such a result."

The Supreme Court continued with its recounting of the history of the
Tellico Dam legislation, noting that Congress expressed, in the
appropriations process, its clear intent to complete the dam:
Less than a month after the District Court decision, the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees recommended the full budget request of S 9 million
for continued work on Tellico. (citations omitted). In its Report accompanying
the appropriations bill, the Senate Committee stated: "During subcommittee
hearings, TVA was questioned about the relationship between the Tellico project's
completion and the November 1975 listing of the snail darter (a small 3-inch fish
which was discovered in 1973) as an endangered species under the Endangered
Species Act. TVA informed the Committee that it was continuing its efforts to
preserve the darter, while working towards the scheduled 1977 completion date.
TVA repeated its view that the Endangered Species Act did not prevent the
completion of the Tellico project, which has been under construction for nearly a
decade. The subcommittee brought this matter, as well as the recent U.S. District
Court's decision upholding TVA's decision to complete the project, to the
attention of the full Committee. The Committee does not view the Endangered
Species Act as prohibiting the completion of the Tellico project at its advanced
stage and directs that this project be completed as promptly as possible in the
public interest." S. Rep. No. 94-960, supra, at 96. (Emphasis added.)
On June 29, 1976, both Houses of Congress passed TVA's general budget,
which included funds
37 for Tellico; the President signed the bill on July 12, 1976.
(citations omitted).

In the preceding passages (and, indeed, in the following passage), the
Court's repeated emphasis on the actions of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees foreshadows the reasons underlying the
Justices' decision. The Court then summarizes the subsequent reversal
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District Court's decision, and
describes subsequent actions prior to the Supreme Court's writ of

certiorari:
Following the issuance of the permanent injunction, members of TVA's Board of
Directors appeared before Subcommittees of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees to testify in support of continued appropriations for

36.
37.

TVA, 437 U.S. at 166-67.
Id. at 167.
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Tellico. The Subcommittees were apprised of all aspects of Tellico's status,
including the Court of Appeals' decision. TVA reported that the dam stood "ready
for the gates to be closed and the reservoir filled," (citations omitted), and
requested funds for completion of certain ancillary parts of the project, such as
public use areas, roads, and bridges. As to the snail darter itself, TVA commented
optimistically on its transplantation efforts, expressing the opinion that the
relocated fish were "doing well and [had] reproduced."
Both Appropriations Committees subsequently recommended the full amount
requested for completion of the Tellico Project. In its June 2, 1977, Report, the
House Appropriations Committee stated: "It is the Committee's view that the
Endangered Species Act was not intended to halt projects such as these in their
advanced stage of completion, and [the Committee] strongly recommends that
these projects not be stopped because of misuse of the Act." H. R. Rep. No. 95379, p. 104. (Emphasis added.) As a solution to the problem, the House
Committee advised that TVA should cooperate with the Department of the
Interior "to relocate the endangered species to another suitable habitat so as to
permit the project to proceed as rapidly as possible." Toward this end, the
Committee recommended
a special appropriation of $2 million to facilitate
relocation of the snail darter and other endangered species which threatened to
delay or stop TVA projects. Much the same occurred on the Senate side, with its
Appropriations Committee recommending both the amount requested to complete
Tellico and the special appropriation for transplantation of endangered species.
Reporting to the Senate on these measures, the Appropriations Committee took a
particularly strong stand on the snail darter issue: "This committee has not viewed
the Endangered Species Act as preventing the completion and use of these
projects which were well under way at the time the affected species were listed as
endangered. If the act has such an effect, which is contrary to the Committee's
understandingof the intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act,
funds should be appropriated to allow these projects to be completed and
their benefits realized in the public interest, the Endangered Species Act
notwithstanding." (citations omitted). (Emphasis added.)
TVA's budget, including funds for completion of Tellico and relocation of the
snail darter, passed both Houses of Congress and was signed into law on August
7, 1977 (citations omitted).3 8

38.
Id. at 170-71. A similar accounting of this episode, but with a rather different
conclusion, is given by Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion in TVA:
In 1975, 1976, and 1977, Congress, with full knowledge of the Tellico Project's
effect on the snail darter and the alleged violation of the Endangered Species Act,
continued to appropriate money for the completion of the Project. In doing so, the
Appropriations Committees expressly stated that the Act did not prohibit the
Project's completion, a view that Congress presumably accepted in approving the
appropriations each year. For example, in June 1976, the Senate Committee on
Appropriations released a report noting the District Court decision and
recommending approval of TVA's full budget request for the Tellico Project. The
Committee observed further that it did "not view the Endangered Species Act as
prohibiting the completion of the Tellico project at its advanced stage," and it

In rejecting this implication of the legislative history, The Court in
TVA reads the ESA as plainly obliging the government to protect the
critical habitat of the snail darter and thereby to shut down the Tellico

Dam. This conclusion follows from the clear injunction of the ESA.3 9
"The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute," declared the

Court, "was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
40

whatever the cost."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell insists that this conclusion

reads the statute as requiring an absurd result, in violation of a major
directed "that this project be completed as promptly as possible in the public
interest." The appropriations bill was passed by Congress and approved by the
President.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit nevertheless reversed the District
Court in January 1977. It held that the Act was intended to create precisely the
sort of dramatic conflict presented in this case: "Where a project is on-going and
substantial resources have already been expended, the conflict between national
incentives to conserve living things and the pragmatic momentum to complete the
project on schedule is most incisive." 549 F.2d 1064, 1071 ....
In June 1977, and after being informed of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the Appropriations Committees in both Houses of Congress again recommended
approval of TVA's full budget request for the Tellico Project. Both Committees
again stated unequivocally that the Endangered Species Act was not intended to
halt projects at an advanced stage of completion: "[The Senate] Committee has
not viewed the Endangered Species Act as preventing the completion and use of
these projects which were well under way at the time the affected species were
listed as endangered. If the act has such an effect, which is contrary to the
Committee's understanding of the intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered
Species Act, funds should be appropriated to allow these projects to be completed
and their benefits realized in the public interest, the Endangered Species Act
notwithstanding." "It is the [House] Committee's view that the Endangered
Species Act was not intended to halt projects such as these in their advanced stage
of completion, and [the Committee] strongly recommends that these projects not
be stopped because of misuse of the Act."
Once again, the appropriations bill was passed by both Houses and signed into
law.
39.
"One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were
any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively
command all federal agencies "to insure that actions authorized,funded, or carried out
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered species or "result
in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species .... 16 U.S.C. § 1536
(1976 ed.) (emphasis added). This language admits of no exception. Nonetheless,
petitioner urges, as do the dissenters, that the Act cannot reasonably be interpreted as
applying to a federal project which was well under way when Congress passed the
Endangered Species Act of 1973. To sustain that position, however, we would be forced
to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language. It has not been shown, for example,
how TVA can close the gates of the Tellico Dam without "carrying out" an action that
has been "authorized" and "funded" by a federal agency." TVA, 437 U.S. at 173.
40. TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.
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canon of construction; 4 1 moreover, the Court's decision, insists Justice
Powell, ignores another canon as well-the presumption against retroactive
statutory effects.42

The most unfortunate aspect of the Court's judgment goes without
mention by the dissenting justices, that is, the invocation of the new
canon, that legislative changes through appropriations are disfavored.
With regard to the lengthy legislative history recounted above, the Court
observes:

41.
TVA, 437 U.S. at 196. This canon of construction, frequently referred to as the
absurdity doctrine, permits judges to disregard the plain meaning of the statutory
language when it would lead to absurd, or perhaps unconstitutional, results. For
examples of the use of this canon, see, e.g., Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 203 (1819), United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1235 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No.
14,647), and Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Company, 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
42. "Today the Court, like the Court of Appeals below, adopts a reading of § 7 of
the Act that gives it a retroactive effect and disregards 12 years of consistently expressed
congressional intent to complete the Tellico Project. With all due respect, I view this
result as an extreme example of a literalist construction, not required by the language of
the Act and adopted without regard to its manifest purpose. Moreover, it ignores
established canons of statutory construction: "[Frequently] words of general meaning are
used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment,
or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,
makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular
act." Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). The result
that will follow in this case by virtue of the Court's reading of § 7 makes it unreasonable
to believe that Congress intended that reading. Moreover, § 7 may be construed in a way
that avoids an "absurd result" without doing violence to its language. TVA, 437 U.S. at
202, 204-05.
..;This is a reasonable construction of the language and also is supported by the
presumption against construing statutes to give them a retroactive effect. As this Court
stated in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States ex rel. Struthers Wells
Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314 (1908), the "presumption is very strong that a statute was not
meant to act retrospectively, and it ought never to receive such a construction if it is
susceptible of any other." This is particularly true where a statute enacts a new regime of
regulation. For example, the presumption has been recognized in cases under the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., holding that the requirement of
filing an environmental impact statement cannot reasonably be applied to projects
substantially completed. E.g., Pizitz, Inc. v. Volpe, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972);
Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1972); Greene County Planning Board v.
FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849. TVA, 437 U.S. at 205-06
(Powell, J., dissenting).
On the foundations and sources of the non-retroactivity of statutory effects, see
Eskridge and Frickey, infra note 150, at 457-81 (1988).

There is nothing in the appropriations measures, as passed, which states that the
Tellico Project was to be completed irrespective of the requirements of the
Endangered Species Act. These appropriations, in fact, represented relatively
minor components of the lump-sum amounts for the entire TVA budget. (The
Appropriations Acts did not themselves identify the projects for which the sums
had been appropriated; identification of these projects requires reference to the
legislative history. See n. 14, supra. Thus, unless a Member scrutinized in detail
the Committee proceedings concerning the appropriations, he would have no
knowledge of the possible conflict between the continued funding and the
Endangered Species Act.) To find a repeal of the Endangered Species Act under
these circumstances would surely do violence to the "'cardinal rule ... that
repeals by implication are not favored."' (Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549
(1974), quoting Posadasv. NationalCity Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)
The doctrine disfavoring repeals by implication "applies with full vigor
when ... the subsequent legislation is an appropriations measure." (quoting
Committeefor Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 382,
463 F.2d 783, 785 (1971) (emphasis added); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 355 (CA8 1972). This is perhaps an understatement since
it would be more accurate to say that the policy applies with even greater force
when the claimed repeal rests solely on an Appropriations Act. We recognize that
both substantive enactments and appropriations measures are "Acts of Congress,"
but the latter have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for
authorized programs. When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are
entitled to operate under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes
which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without such an assurance,
every appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering
substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might
prohibit the expenditure. Not only would this lead to the absurd result of requiring
Members to review exhaustively the background of every authorization before
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules the Congress carefully
adopted to avoid this need. House Rule XXI (2), for instance, specifically
provides: "No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or
be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously
authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works
as are already in progress. Nor shall any provision in any such43bill or amendment
thereto changing existing law be in order." (Emphasis added).

The court makes several assumptions in drawing a new canon from
the list of canonical strictures that the Supreme Court had previously
adopted, and in contravention of several other canons (as Llewellyn
could have foretold). We discuss these assumptions at greater length
below. For now, notice the basic assumption underlying the Court's
treatment of the legislative history: that Congress could not possibly
have meant to limit the scope of the ESA by its repeated decisions to
expend money for the building of the Tellico Dam; rather, they would be
read as intending to do so only where they (a) had put into the language
of the ESA a stipulation that the Tellico Dam project would not be
43.

TVA, 437 U.S. at 189-91.
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disturbed by this legislation, or (b) had specifically and unambiguously
repealed the ESA to the extent that it covered critical habitats in the
Tellico Dam region.
Moreover, the Supreme Court went out of its way to show its distaste
for what it saw as the nondeliberative nature of the Congressional
appropriations process:
Perhaps mindful of the fact that it is "swimming upstream" against a strong
current of well-established precedent, TVA argues for an exception to the rule
against implied repeals in a circumstance where, as here, Appropriations
Committees have expressly stated their "understanding" that the earlier legislation
would not prohibit the proposed expenditure. We cannot accept such a
proposition. Expressions of committees dealing with requests for appropriations
cannot be equated with statutes enacted by Congress, particularly not in the
circumstances presented by this case. First, the Appropriations Committees had no
jurisdiction over the subject of endangered species, much less did they conduct
the type of extensive hearings which preceded passage of the earlier Endangered
Species Acts, especially the 1973 Act. We venture to suggest that the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Senate Committee on
Commerce would be somewhat surprised to learn that their careful work on the
substantive legislation had been undone by the simple-and brief-insertion of
some inconsistent language in Appropriations Committees' Reports.
Second, there is no indication that Congress as a whole was aware of TVA's
position, although the Appropriations Committees apparently agreed with
petitioner's views. Only recently, in SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), we
declined to presume general congressional acquiescence in a 34-year-old practice
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, despite the fact that the Senate
Committee having jurisdiction over the Commission's activities had long
expressed approval of the practice. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, speaking for the
Court, observed that we should be "extremely hesitant to presume general
congressional awareness of the Commission's construction based only upon a few
isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative documents." Id., at
121. A fortiori, we should not assume that petitioner's views-and the
Appropriations Committees' acceptance of them-were any better known,
especially when the TVA is not the agency
with primary responsibility for
44
administering the Endangered Species Act.

44.
TVA, 437 U.S. at 191-92. The Supreme Court then questioned the actual
intent of Congress, as if the committee reports were genuine reflections of this intent,
arguing that the TVA misled the appropriations committees in its statements and thus the
Court questioned the context of the committees' and later Congress's decisions:
Quite apart from the foregoing factors, we would still be unable to find that in this
case "the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable," Mancari, 417 U.S., at 550;
here it is entirely possible "to regard each as effective." Id. at 551. The starting
point in this analysis must be the legislative proceedings leading to the 1977
appropriations since the earlier funding of the dam occurred prior to the listing of

Recounting at length the Court's discussion of the facts of the Tellico
Dam episode helps shed light on the question which under girded the
Court's creation of the appropriations canon. Clearly, the Court looked
skeptically at Congress's decisions regarding the dam and its future
within the appropriations process. The Court was dubious that Congress
focused squarely on the inconsistency between the charge of the ESA
and the pursuit of the Tellico Dam project; and, more broadly, they
questioned the extent to which Congress as a whole grasped the impact
of what the appropriations committees were recommending. In the end,
the appropriations process in the House and Senate was described, if
indirectly, as just so many hidden legislative machinations. And,
implicitly, the process by which the ESA came about in 1973 was
viewed as both ordinary and salutary.
The same considerations underlay the Court's decision in 1992 in
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.45 Robertson, like TVA, involved a

major environmental dispute involving the ESA. In this case, the
dispute arose from the decision of the Forest Service to prohibit timber
harvesting in the Pacific Northwest because such harvesting would
disturb the habitat of the northern spotted owl, an endangered species
under the ESA. The essential claim of the loggers was that Congress

the snail darter as an endangered species. In all successive years, TVA confidently
reported to the Appropriations Committees that efforts to transplant the snail
darter appeared to be successful; this surely gave those Committees some basis for
the impression that there was no direct conflict between the Tellico Project and
the Endangered Species Act. Indeed, the special appropriation for 1978 of $ 2
million for transplantation of endangered species supports the view that the
Committees saw such relocation as the means whereby collision between Tellico
and the Endangered Species Act could be avoided. It should also be noted that the
Reports issued by the Senate and House Appropriations Committees in 1976 came
within a month of the District Court's decision in this case, which hardly could
have given the Members cause for concern over the possible applicability of the
Act. This leaves only the 1978 appropriations, the Reports for which issued after
the Court of Appeals' decision now before us. At that point very little remained to
be accomplished on the project; the Committees understandably advised TVA to
cooperate with the Department of the Interior "to relocate the endangered species
to another suitable habitat so as to permit the project to proceed as rapidly as
possible." H. R. Rep. No. 95-379, p. 11 (1977). It is true that the Committees
repeated their earlier expressed "view" that the Act did not prevent completion of
the Tellico Project. Considering these statements in context, however, it is evident
that they "'represent only the personal views of these legislators,"' and "however
explicit, [they] cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed
before the Act's passage." Regional Rail ReorganizationAct Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
132 (1974).
TVA, 437 U.S. at 102-93.
45.
503 U.S. 429 (1992).
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had enacted, through the appropriations process, legislation which
authorized some timber logging in these areas, notwithstanding the ESA.
This legislation, found in Section 318 of the Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, created the Northwest
Timber Compromise.4 6 As its name suggests, this Act reflected Congress's
judgment that the severe prohibition of logging required by a strict
reading of the ESA should be tempered by the identified interest in
harvesting "within a geographically and temporally limited domain."47
The scope of this change was quite limited, however. The Compromise
applied only to thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington;48
and it expired automatically on September 30, 1990.49 Despite the
limited scope of this provision, environmental groups argued that
Congress had repealed key sections of the ESA by implication, insofar
as these provisions protected the spotted owl habitat in the areas covered
by the Timber Compromise. Apparently, Congress and its committees
had not learned the lesson of TVA.
Although the Court reached its ultimate judgment on other grounds, it
did discuss the appropriations canon announced in TVA v. Hill.
Rejecting the lower court's judgment that the relevant subsection of the
appropriations act "'could not' effect an implied modification of substantive
law because it was embedded in an appropriations measure,"50 the Court
in Robertson made clear that "Congress... may amend substantive law
in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so clearly."5 1 Taking back
with one hand what it gave with another, though, the Court reiterated
that "repeals by implication are especially disfavored in the appropriations
context." 52 Therefore, Robertson is rightly read as a reaffirmation of the
appropriations canon invented in TVA. At the same time, Robertson is
important for its holding that Congress can repeal, through explicit
appropriations legislation, parts of the ESA and similarly clear substantive
legislation.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

103 Stat. 745.
Robertson, 503 U.S. at 433.
§ 318(i).
§ 318(k).
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id.

B. The Canon's Rationale
From where does this idea that legislative changes through the
appropriations process are disfavored derive? The Court in TVA based
its canon not upon any overarching theory of the appropriations process,
but, rather, on the longstanding interpretive rule that repeals by
implication are disfavored.5 3 Implied repeals have long been viewed by
the courts as spurious.54 The essential concern is that the legislature may
be unaware of the impact of its current decision on existing law.
Requiring explicit repeals gives the courts confidence that Congress has
focused squarely on the consequences of legislative action. In an 1842
case, Justice Joseph Story for the Court argued that "[t]he more natural,
if not the necessary inference

.

. .

is that the legislature intend the new

laws to be auxiliary to and in aid of the purposes of the old law, even
when some of the cases provided for may equally be within the reach of
each." 55 Accordingly, says Justice Story, "[t]here certainly, under such
circumstances, ought to be a manifest and total repugnancy in the
provisions to lead to the conclusion that the latter laws abrogated, and
were designed to abrogate the former."56
Repeals by legislative action can come about in two different ways:
Either Congress can specifically supplant an earlier statute, or Congress
can enact legislation which repeals earlier legislation by implication.
This second category include situations in which "provisions in the two
acts are in irreconciliable conflict" and where "the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute .

. . ."

In any event, "the intention of the legislature to repeal

must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing, the
later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for,
the first act and will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the
same, from the time of the first enactment."58
The seminal modem case is Morton v. Mancari.9 In Morton, the
Court considered federal legislation concerning hiring preferences in the
Indian service.
In 1934, Congress enacted a law providing for
preferences for Indians in hiring by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.60 In
53.

SeeTVA, 437U.S. at 189-90.

54.
55.
56.

See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1974).
Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342, 363 (1842).
Id.

57.
58.
106 U.S.
59.
60.

Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
See id. See also United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 92; Red Rock v. Henry,
596; United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546.
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.
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the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress specifically exempted tribal
employment from the coverage of Title VII. 61 Eight years later, Congress
expanded the scope of anti-discrimination legislation to include federal
employment. 62 The question before the Court in Morton was whether
these statutes effectively repealed the Indian hiring preference created in
1934.
In addition to legislative history in 1964 and 1972 suggesting that the
preference was intended to be kept intact,63 the Court invoked the canon
disfavoring repeals by implication. Somewhat curiously, the Court
observed that "[a] provision aimed at furthering Indian self-government
by according an employment preference within the BIA for qualified
members of the governed group can readily co-exist with a general rule
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race. 64 Yet, the
issue in Morton was precisely whether proscribing employment
discrimination without exempting Indians was evidence that Congress
intended to nonetheless exempt Indians.6 5
The key step in TVA, echoed in Robertson, was to equate substantive
changes within the appropriations process with the disfavored repeals by
implication.6 6 As the Court says in TVA, this presumption applies "with
full vigor" when an appropriations measure is at issue. 67 The connection
between these two interpretive rules rests on the assumption that
legislatures do not deliberate adequately when they are occupied with
61.

See ROy BROOKS, ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES

397-559 (2d ed. 2000).
62.
Id.
63.
For example, when discussing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Senate sponsor,
Senator Humphrey, stated on the floor that: "This exemption [excluding tribal
employment from the coverage of Title VII] is consistent with the Federal Government's
policy of encouraging Indian employment and with the special legal position of Indians"
110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964). In a similar manner, Senator Mundt supported this
exemption by arguing that it would allow Indians "to benefit from Indian preference
programs now in operation or later to be instituted" 110 Cong. Rec. 13702 (1964).
64.
417 U.S. at 550.
65.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the presumption against repeals by
implication and its rule that this presumption will be overcome only where : "provisions

in two statutes are in 'irreconcilable conflict,' or where the latter act covers the whole of
the earlier one and 'is clearly intended as a substitute."' Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254
(2003).

66.
U.S. 429
67.
149 U.S.

TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503
(1992).
TVA, 437 U.S. at 190, citing Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg,
App. D. C. 380, 382, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (1971).

appropriations.
Implied repeals presuppose that Congress does not
focus squarely on the question whether the current and previous statute
can coexist when enacting legislation. And, where Congress is passing
laws within the appropriations process, it is similarly supposed that
Congress is simply not paying attention6 9 Thus, the changes to the
statute made during the appropriations process are, from the TVA and
Robertson Court's vantage point, implied in two senses: First, Congress
does not say "this section is hereby repealed;" and, second, the
appropriations-related provision does not evince clear Congressional
intent to repeal the earlier legislation. In the TVA episode, for example,
Congress did not specifically announce that it was repealing the ESA to
the extent that it prohibited the building of the Tellico Dam. Therefore,
the only basis for Congressional supplanting of the ESA was an implicit
one.
Why are repeals by implication disfavored? And, in any event, why
do courts deem appropriations legislation as of lesser status than
authorizing legislation? More to the point, why do courts presume that
legislative repeals through the appropriations process are implied repeals
and, indeed, especially noxious? To understand this, we must investigate
the logic of the appropriations canon.
Although nowhere explicitly stated, the arguments of the Supreme
Court in crafting the appropriations canon rest on a series of
controversial assumptions. Most fundamentally, the TVA and Robertson
Courts object to the use of the appropriations process in making
legislative changes on the grounds that the appropriations process is
hurried, opaque, and, on the whole, nondeliberative. As Professors
Eskridge and Ferejohn succinctly put the objection, "[a]ppropriations
laws perform important public functions, but they are usually shortsighted and have little effect on the law beyond the years for which
they apportion public monies." 7 This is both a positive and normative
assertion. In its positive sense, the Court describes the process by which
Congress makes substantive changes to authorizing acts through the
appropriations process as fundamentally nondeliberative. Moreover, the
Court insists that this manner of decisionmaking reflects a legislative
failure. In objecting to congressional action on this basis, it is assumed
that the Constitution prefers that Congress enact legislation through
68.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-33.
69. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL, 2004 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION 117 (3d ed. 2004) ("the Mancari presumption against implied repeals is

one that is rarely overcome").
70.
(2001).

William Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215
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deliberative decision making processes; or, at the very least, a sensible
theory of legislative decisionmaking demands a level of deliberation not
met by Congress in its appropriations-related processes. Though this
assumption is only implicit, it is necessary, for otherwise the Supreme
Court would have no ground for favoring authorization over appropriations.
The Court in TVA questioned the extent to which the appropriations
process meets the standard for an essentially deliberative process. For
example, in criticizing the appropriations process's level of representation,
the Court argued, "there is no indication that Congress as a whole was
aware of TVA's position, although the Appropriations Committees
apparently agreed with petitioner's views."71 In discussing a series of
committee reports related to TVA funding, the Court also implied that
Congress's decision was not adequately reasoned: "It is true that the
Committees repeated their earlier expressed 'view' that the Act did not
prevent completion of the Tellico Project. Considering these statements
in context, however, it is evident that they "represent only the personal
views of these legislators," and "however explicit, [they] cannot serve to
change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act's
passage."7 2 Moreover, the Court in TVA objected that these substantive
changes were not sufficiently transparent, writing that "we should not
assume the petitioner's views-and the Appropriations Committees'
acceptance of them-were any better known, especially when the TVA
is not the agency with primary responsibility for administering the
Endangered Species Act."73 Thus, the Court concludes that appropriations
acts are not the product of adequate legislative deliberation and,
accordingly, we should not implement policy changes in this way.
By way of contrast, the Court insists that the enactment of legislation
through the normal authorization process (by which the Endangered
Species Act was passed, for instance) is more deliberative than is the
appropriations process. As support for its position, the Supreme Court
pointed out that both houses of Congress limit policy making within the
appropriations process.74 Policy change within appropriations cannot be
71.
TVA, 437 U.S. at 192. Compare the analysis by Judge Seth for the Tenth
Circuit in Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973): "Appropriations
acts are just as effective a way to legislate as are ordinary bills relating to a particular
subject." Id. at 22-23.
72.
TVA, at 193 (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
132 (1972).
73.
TVA, 437 U.S. at 192.
74. Indeed, the Court made reference to both the House Rules and the Standing

implied, it must be explicit, because Congress must act transparently and,
thereby, with deliberately. Given the nature of the appropriations process,
Congress cannot meet this deliberation requirement through this device.
The logic of the appropriations canon can be stated thusly: In a conflict
between two statutes, both duly and properly enacted, the Court should
favor the one that was passed through a more deliberative process. Since
the above conditions are generalizable, this implies that authorization
lawmaking should always be favored over appropriations, unless
Congress was clear in its change in authorization through appropriations.
III. THE APPROPRIATIONS CANON REVISITED: IMPLICATIONS
OF A POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF LAWMAKING

The invention and deployment of the appropriations canon represents
a good example of the courts' use of canons to further substantive agendas.
More specifically, canons such as the one described in this article
furthers policy aims by promoting particular legislative outcomes and
encouraging the use of particular legislative processes. While the former
goal is unabashedly substantive, the second is proceduralist in that it is
designed to improve the legislative process. "
Canonical construction on these outcome-oriented bases should be
distinguished from the development and use of canons that purport to
mirror legislative intent.76 Courts frequently use canons as surrogates
for legislative intent; they also use various maxims of word choice and
grammar in order to assist judges with disentangling from the complex
web of statutory structure and history the most sensible construction of
legislative intent and statutory meaning. Whatever are the strengths and
limits of this type of canonical construction, the appropriations canon
cannot be explained or justified on this basis. Instead, the appropriations
canon-like the canon that repeals by implication are disfavored-is
purely substantive.
Rules of the Senate when supporting its position. It stated:
House Rule XXI (2), for instance, specifically provides:
No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or be in
order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized
by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works as are
already in progress. Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment
thereto changing existing law be in order. (Emphasis added.)
See also Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule 16.4 (TVA, 437 U.S. at 191).
75.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984).
76.
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 818-48 (3d ed. 2001).

690

Canonical Construction

[Vol. 14: 669, 2005]

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

What are the substantive values that the canon is designed to implement?
One central value is less substantive change to authorization statutes
through the appropriations process. By restricting such changes, Congress
must pursue their reform objectives through the ordinary legislative
process, that is, through adjustments to the authorizing legislation; or, at
the very least, Congress must repeal authorizing legislation explicitly, a
process that we can presume to be more difficult to achieve. A second
value is the improvement of the legislative process. As explained above,
the appropriations process has been criticized by the Court as being
hurried, opaque and, in general, insufficiently deliberative. Forcing
Congress to go through the authorization process enhances deliberation
by channeling legislators into an arena in which deliberation is more
common than it is in the appropriations process. The notion is not so
much that the legislators will become more interested in deliberation per
se but, rather, they will be in a better position to engage in deliberative
decisionmaking. We suggest that both of these assumptions are flawed.
A. Appropriationsand the DeliberativeIdeal
Political theorists and legal scholars have forged a complex, and rather
appealing, normative argument for deliberative democracy.77 Philosopher
Philip Petit explains the logic of the argument:
Most of the arguments for deliberative democracy assume that the case for an

inclusive democracy is palpable and focus on the benefit to a democratically
organized group of having decision governed by deliberation of an inclusive,
dialogical kind. Some of these arguments assert that making democracy
deliberative should help to ensure that people's preferences are reflecting and
informed, as distinct from remaining the brute product of adaptation to
circumstance; or that it should enable people to do better in reaching beyond the
chasms of difference that separate the members of certain groups, even if it does
not bring them into consensus; or that it should stretch people's imagination and
empathy as they are forced to take a general point of view. Without alleging any
such

psychological

transformation,

other arguments maintain

that making

democracy deliberative should at least have the effect of screening out selfregarding concerns in favor of more public-spirited considerations, thereby
approximating or advancing an ideal of public reasoning among free and equal
participants. And yet a further range of arguments urge that making democracy
deliberative would promote such effects as legitimizing whatever decisions are
reached, making them more likely to take account of the relatively powerless,
77.
See, e.g., JOHN DRYZEK, DELBERATtvE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND (2000); JAMES
FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS
(1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).

increasing transparency among
7 ° members of the group, or promoting just
outcomes. [citations omitted].

Responding to the powerful critique of representative democracy
developed by scholars building upon the rational choice tradition,79
deliberation theorists have argued for institutional arrangements and
legal rules which would, if properly configured, promote deliberation
within the legislature. 80 For these theorists, the measure of a useful
institution or rule is whether it facilitates deliberation in legislative
lawmaking. 8
What do we mean by deliberative legislating? A deliberative legislative
process has at least the following four fundamental characteristics: 82
First, deliberative processes are representative and democratic, both in
the sense that many participate in the decision making process and,
further, in the sense that diverse views are presented and given attention.
Second, deliberative processes are also more reasoned or and closely
83
considered.
That is, in presenting their views, people give reasons for
their positions and these reasons are the point of discussion.8 4 Third,
deliberative processes are highly transparentand, thereby, accessible to
the public and outsiders. Finally, deliberative processes are aim for
consensual decision making.
A useful way to reformulate this rather abstract description of deliberation
is to think about the question "what constitutes the appropriate measure
of adequate legislative deliberation?" In order to determine whether and

78.

Philip Pettit, A Dilemma for Deliberative Democrats, in DELIBERATION AND

DECISION: ECONOMICS, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

91,

99-100 (Anne van Aaken, et al. eds., 2004).
79.
See, e.g., NORMAN J. SCHOFIELD, SOCIAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRACY (1985);
WILLIAM RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982)

80.
See, e.g., Philip Petit, Democracy, Electoral and Contestatory, in NOMOS XLII:
DESIGNING DEMOCATIC INSTITUTIONS 105, 124-37 (Stephen Macedo & Ian Shapiro eds., 2000).
81.
See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,
in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL (Seyla

Benhabib ed., 1996).
82.
These four characteristics of deliberative processes are described in John
Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in NOMOS XLII: DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS (Stephen Macedo & Ian Shapiro eds., 2000).
See, e.g., John Dryzek, Constitutionalism and its Alternatives, in DELIBERATION
83.
AND DECISION: ECONOMICS, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 47

(Anne van Aaken, et al. eds., 2004) ("Reasoning constitutively, an actor goes beyond the
instrumental question of whether an action will help achieve some set of goals. The actor also
asks whether or not the action helps constitute or undermine a desirable world or situation").
84.

See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) (describing deliberative

democracy as a "republic of reasons").
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to what extent Congress has adequately deliberated or, rather, whether
the process it has followed can be properly characterized as deliberative,
we want to know the answers to these three questions:
1. Are the various interests at stake (not only the interested groups
but the interests themselves, regardless of whether these
interests have particular champions) adequately represented
within the process Congress uses to make its decisions?85
2. Has Congress constructed a procedure to ensure that its
policies can be implemented in accordance with its will and
objectives? In the vernacular of regulatory theory, we may ask:
Has Congress constructed mechanisms of adequate delegation
and control?8 6
3. Has Congress made decisions with the transparency and reasoning
adequate to assure Americans generally and, in particular, the
institutions responsible for implementing its policies that these
legislative decisions are based upon sound theory and evidence
and are reflective of consensual decisionmaking (though not
necessarily, of course, consensus views)? 87
The deliberative ideal is, after all, an ideal. Seldom is the case for
deliberative decisionmaking made on the principle that Congress can
truly achieve its ideal. Deliberation theorists are not, in the main, hopelessly
naive; legislative decisionmaking is understood to be political, messy,
and frequently combative. Yet, those who embrace deliberation as an
ideal insist that we ought to measure legislative decisionmaking in
accordance with deliberation criteria, that is, with standards that consider
how effectively does the legislature meet its "responsibilities" for

The roots of the arguments for representation as an essential pre-condition for
85.
deliberation can be traced to the arguments about equality and political communication.
A seminal text in this regard is JURGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, VOLUMES 1 & 2 (1984, 1989). See also DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster
ed. 1998); Joshua Cohen, Deliberationand Democracy Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY

(Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989).
86.

See, e.g., JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE

INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002) (developing theory of

discretion and delegation with emphasis on transparency and policy responsiveness).
87.
See, e.g., Christian Kirchner, Final Remarks: Deliberation and DecisionPerspectivesand Limitations, in NOMIS XLII, at 261, 262 ("Deliberation is supposed to
be a social process in which the participants are searching for the common interest, i.e.
the common interest of a given society").

representativeness, optimal delegation and control, and adequate
transparency and reasoning.
As previously mentioned, we put "responsibilities" in quotation marks
because we question whether this deliberative ideal is a worthy aspiration
for legislative decisionmaking in the U.S. system. One of us has
questioned whether American political behavior can be deliberative in
the sense described by contemporary deliberation theorists, given the
nature of individual choice under conditions of scarcity and otherwise. 8
Though a full discussion of deliberation in Congress is well beyond the
scope of this article, we note that the ideal of deliberation presupposes
that legislators are capable of the sustained behavior-particularly the
effort at consensual decisionmaking and sound "reasoning"-that deliberation
theorists suppose to be essential to representative lawmaking.
Moreover, contemporary public law scholars who argue for a more
conspicuously deliberative legislative process frequently insist that
deliberative decisionmaking is mandated by the Constitution. Bruce
Ackerman, 89 David Estlund,9 ° Frank Michelman, 91 Cass Sunstein, 92 and
others have made the broad point that the Constitution, particularly after
the enactment of the 14th amendment, is designed to promote the civic
republican ideals of deliberation and dialogic self-government. A
thorough consideration of these sophisticated debates is beyond the
scope of this article. However, the process-perfecting 93 rationale for the
deployment of certain substantive canons such as the appropriations
canon is not tethered persuasively to the constitutional structure of
lawmaking in Article I, Section 7. The success of the effort to establish
the deliberative ideal as a compelling principle for American lawmaking
requires a more coherent effort to explain why the constitutional
structure of lawmaking is designed to promote deliberation. Or, to put
the point another way, what is the basis to believe that the Constitution
favors a more deliberative over a less deliberative method of lawmaking?

88.

See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 226-

27 (1998).
89. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Discoveringthe Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
90. See, e.g., David Estlund, Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the
Strategic/DeliberativeDichotomy in Recent ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 71 TEXAS L.
REV. 1437 (1993).
91.
See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1986).
92. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 75, at 29.
93. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

[Vol. 14: 669, 2005]

Canonical Construction
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

B. The AppropriationsProcess and Legislative Policymaking
1. Representation
Courts and commentators take issue with the lack of representation
during the appropriations process.9 4 This criticism misses the mark.
First, because the appropriations process is inherently about money
and resource allocation, there are vastly more stakeholders in the
appropriations process. The plethora of interests implicated by the resource
allocations made in the appropriations process demand attention by key
legislators and majority party officials to the expressed preferences of
legislators. While a particular authorization statute may implicate a
broad swath of interests within Congress, the impact of appropriations
decisions is uniquely wide-ranging and ubiquitous. Everything we know
about the structure of incentives in the modem Congress indicates that
the influence by legislators will be brought to bear on appropriations
committee members, on party leaders, and on others whose participation
in appropriations are direct and significant. 95
Second, within Congress, the Appropriations Committee is the largest,
most representative committee. Between 1971 and 1974, during which
the ESA and Tellico Dam issues were both considered in the House, 55
representatives (more than 1/8th of the entire body) served on the
appropriations committee and in the Senate 24 members served on
appropriations in the 92nd (1971-72) Congress and 26 in the 93rd
Congress. In the House between 1971 and 1974, the majority Democrats
took 33 of the 55 seats, which is approximately proportional to their
membership in the overall House. In the Senate, Democrats took 13 of
the 24 seats in the 92nd Congress and 15 of the 26 seats in the 93rd
Congress, a distribution that is also equivalent to their membership in
the overall Senate.96 Currently, the House Appropriations Committee
has 65 members and the respective Senate committee has 29 members. 97

94. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 70.
95. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN
56-133 (1991).
96. For party and committee membership in the 92nd Congress see Official
Congressional Directory, 92nd Congress, US Government Printing Office, Washington:
1971 and for the 93rd Congress see Official Congressional Directory, 93rd Congress, US
Government Printing Office, Washington 1973.
97. For information on the current House Appropriations Committee see
http://appropriations.house.gov and for information about the current Senate
Appropriations see: http://appropriations.senate.gov.

Although the Budget committees did not yet exist in the 92nd and 93rd
Congresses, the 2004 House Budget Committee has 43 members and the
Senate Budget Committee has 23 members.98 Members normally do not
serve on both the Budget and Appropriations committees simultaneously, a
situation which ensures that there is widespread representation of the
House membership during the budget and appropriations process.
The members chosen to serve on the House Appropriations
Committees are also ideologically similar to the party they represent,
and in the aggregate are quite close to the entire House membership.
Between the 80th and 100th Congress, the Democratic and Republican
contingents on the Appropriations Committee were statistically different
than their respective party's caucuses in only three instances. 99
Additionally, the distribution of each party's contingent on appropriations is
rarely different than the distribution of the party caucus.'l° In fact, the
distribution of Democrats on appropriations was never different than
their party caucus; moreover, Republicans on appropriations differed
from their caucus only twice between the 80th and 100th Congress.0 1
As Professors Kiewiet and McCubbins note: "As long as the Republicans
are given proportional representation on the committee (which they are)
and as long as they are concentrated to the right of the Democrats (which
they are), the distribution of Democrats on the committee would have to
be extremely nonuniform for them not to do a better job of matching the
entire chamber median than of matching their own caucus median."10 2
Taken together, this evidence suggests that the Appropriations and
Budget committees are quite representative of each party and also of the
entire membership of the House.
Third and finally, the bills reported from the Appropriations Committees
are among the most frequently amended of all legislation. To measure
the floor amendment activity for each committee's bills, political scientist
Steven Smith constructs an index using number of amendments,
number of amendments per measure, proportion of amendments
subject to at least one amendment, the number of successful amendments
and the number of contested amendment. Based on this index, bills
reported from the Appropriations Committee in both the House and

98.
For membership information on the U.S. House Budget Committee see:
http://www.house.gov/budget. For information about the US Senate Budget Committee
see: http://www.senate.gov/-budget.
99.
See GARY COX & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION, ch. 8
(1993) (using NOMINATE scores to measure ideology).
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102. See KIEWIET & McCUBBINs, LEVIATHAN, supra note 95, at 102-03.
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Senate are among the top three most amended in the five Congresses
studied between 1955 and 1985.103 Data from the 83rd to 106th Congress
10 4
demonstrate that 31% of all amendments are to appropriations legislation.
This is not to imply that all politicians are represented during appropriations
or that all contrary views receive equal time for consideration. However, it
does suggest that a variety of interests are represented during the
appropriations process. Stakeholders are engaged, active, and participate in
the process by which Congress expends money during the regular
appropriations process. There is precious little reason to believe that this
involvement wanes when the issue turns to modifying authorizing
legislation through the appropriations process.
2. Delegation and Control
In TVA, the Court is worried that too much discretion is left to House
and Senate committees,1 5 the implication being that majoritarianism is
thereby undermined. The result, therefore, is a product that does not
reflect adequate representation within Congress. What this observation
misses is that the key committees, acting as agents of the majority
party within the legislature exert control over the development and
implementation of legislative policy. Hence, the concern about inadequate
deliberation is simply belied by the architecture of the legislative process
and, in particular, the structure of legislative control over policymaking.
The institutional design of Congress reflects a strong interest on the
part of all legislators, and particularly the majority party who sets the
congressional agenda, to manage and monitor the critical appropriations
process.
To that end, Congress has structured the appropriations
committee system to assure, to the best of legislators' ability, that
appropriations decisions reflect the will of the legislative majority.10 6

103.

See STEVENS. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER 176-83 (1989).

104.

See DAVID W. ROHDE, ROLL CALL VOTING DATA FOR THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1953-2000. Compiled by the Political Institutions and
Public Choice Program, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 2003. This
percentage was computed by dividing the number of straight amendments on issues
classified as appropriations by the total number of straight amendments.
105.
TVA, 437 U.S. at 193.
106.
See KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, LEVIATHAN, supra note 95, at 102-03; Cox &
MCCUBBINS, DELEGATION, supra note 99, at 188-229. Cox and McCubbins find that,
using interest group and NOMINATE measures of ideology, there is rarely a difference
between the median Democrat or Republican on appropriations and the median of her
respective party. Additionally, they find that there is also rarely a difference between the

Appropriations is one of three control committees in the U.S. House (the
other two are Rules and Ways and Means), °7 and the majority party
takes special care to ensure that appointees to these committees are loyal
08
to the majority party. 1
To legislate successfully, politicians need to control the agenda. 10 9
The principal technique that the majority party employs to control the
policymaking process is to delegate to a central authority and implement
checks and balances to control individual politicians." 0 The checks and
balances include rules regarding how bills get to the floor, the jurisdiction
of committees, and expectation regarding the behavior of committee
chairs.
To see how this works with the appropriations process, consider the
following: The Budget process begins well before the fiscal year that
starts each October. Approximately a year-and-a-half before the fiscal
year actually begins, agencies begin to work with the President and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop agency budget
requests."' About one year before the fiscal year commences the President
and the OMB makes decisions regarding agency budget requests in a
process called "passback.""' 2 This process provides opportunities for the
agencies to appeal the OMB and President's decisions. Congress
typically starts work on its version of the budget 10 /2 months before
each fiscal year. In the February before the start of the fiscal year, the
President submits a budget to Congress. This is a public document." 3 At
distribution of each party's contingent on appropriations and the overall party caucus.
107. Control committees monitor the flow of legislation for the majority party,
supervise other committees' legislative products, and, therefore, enable the majority
party to control the legislative agenda. For example, all committees must go through the
Rules Committee to get their bills to the floor, and the Appropriations Committee ensures that
all committees adhere to a single budget. GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 20, 61 (1993).

Gary W.

Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in
the U.S. House of Representatives, at http://www.settingtheagenda.com.
108. See COX & MCCUBBINS, DELEGATION, supra note 99, at 164-82 (discussing
the role loyalty plays in assignments to control committees).

109.

See Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Agency Power in the U.S. House

of Representatives,1877-1986, in PARTY PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 107 (D. Brady & M. McCubbins eds.,

2002). See also Cox & McCubbins, Setting the Agenda 6-28 (2005), at http://www.
settingtheagenda.com.
110.

Id.

See also KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, LEVIATHAN, supra note 95, at 22-55;

Cox & McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, supra note 109, at 30-61.
ll1.
Bill Heniff Jr. "Overview of the Executive Budget Process" CRS Report for
Congress, at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS20175.pdf (July 28, 2003).
112.
113.

Id.
See BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 1921,42 STAT. 20 (JUNE 10, 1921).
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about this time, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) submits a report
on the economic and budget outlook to House and Senate Budget
Committees. Each substantive committee in Congress then has an
opportunity to report their views and estimates to the respective Budget
committee. At this point, the House and Senate must pass a budget
resolution. From the budget resolution, which creates overall spending
targets for the defined policy areas, the Appropriations committees
undertake the process of determining spending priorities. Eventually, the
House and Senate bills are reconciled and signed by the President before
they take effect.114 Throughout this process documents produced by
agencies, President, Congress, OMB and CBO are public documents,
available to anyone who asks, and certainly available to Congresspersons.
As discussed in other sections, and made even more clear here, the
length and public nature of the budget process provide significant
opportunity for legislators, experts, agency officials, and other members
of the public to comment on the proposed legislation.
Courts and commentators appear to believe and dislike that the
appropriations committee is heavy-handed." 5 For example, in TVA, the
majority wrote: "We venture to suggest that the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Senate Committee on Commerce
would be somewhat surprised to learn that their careful work on the
substantive legislation had been undone by the simple-and briefinsertion of some inconsistent language in Appropriations Committees'
Reports."" 6 However, the Court misunderstands the legislative process.
By way of summary, the following figure demonstrates many of the
points regarding control of the agenda, procedure, and checks on delegated
authority. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the legislative process
in the US House of Representatives, demonstrating the path that any
piece of legislation must travel in order to become law. It is important to
note the numerous places where a proposal may be revised, amended, or
halted altogether-negative agenda control. By unraveling who influences
the decision at each of these points (control of agenda and procedure)whether an individual, a faction, or a party-it is possible to assess the
degree to which interests are balanced in a nation's legislative process.

114.
See Robert Keith, "A Brief Introduction to the Federal Budget Process", CRS
Report for Congress (Nov. 13, 1996), at http://www.house.gov/rules/96-912.htm.
115.
See supra text accompanying note 71-73.
116. TVA, 437 U.S. 153 at 191.

FIGURE 1: HOW A PROPOSAL BECOMES A POLICY IN THE US HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HIGHLIGHTING ASPECTS OF PARTY CONTROL
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In the initial stages of the U.S. policymaking process, the substantive
committees in each chamber possess significant agenda control within
their jurisdiction. Given members' attraction to committees that are
substantively salient to their constituents, legislators who are most
concerned with the policy at hand have asymmetric influence at this
early stage. As a proposal approaches the floor, however, the party's
influence may be felt more and more. Majority party members delegate
to their leadership the power to represent their interests on a broad
variety of matters.' 7 The Rules Committee and the Speaker-as well as
the Appropriations Committee, if any funding is required to implement
the proposal-check committee members' ability to exploit their agenda
117.
See Cox & MCCUBBINS, DELEGATION, supra note 99, at 83-135; Cox &
McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, supra note 109, at 30-61 (discussing the way in which
the majority party delegates to central leadership in order to solve the collective action
problems associated with the legislative process).
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control, for these two central coordinating bodies control access to
plenary time. If a substantive committee's proposal is unrepresentative
of the party's collective interests, and it is an issue of importance to the
party, then either the Speaker or the Rules Committee are likely to kill
the proposal. The shortage of plenary time itself creates incentives for
the substantive committees to compete against each other, in something
of a tournament, where the reward for satisfying the party's interest is
time for floor consideration.1 18 Before the proposal leaves the chamber,
there may be floor amendments; and, of course, the legislature votes on
the final bill. There are thus many opportunities for legislators to form
coalitions to influence and potentially kill a bill. At all of these stages,
procedure and who controls it is critically important. Lastly, albeit not
explicitly captured by this figure, is the matter of what happens if policy
is not made. All policy is made, unmade, amended, and/or disregarded
with this reversionary policy. Certain policies, which happen to command
majority support, may be difficult to pass if the reversionary policy is
preferred by members who occupy veto gates-negative agenda control.
In sum, the three elements discussed-agenda, status quo, and procedural
control-repeatedly overlap one another throughout the policymaking
process to structure the policymaking, provide checks and balances
between the various interests, and define the boundaries of which
interests will be represented.
There is little reason to believe that authorizing legislation is not
similarly structured and, therefore, similarly subject to control by the
devices described above. As discussed earlier, the appropriations process is
clearly no less representative than the authorization process-indeed, we
believe that more people's views are likely represented during the
appropriations process than during the normal process of authorization.
And, given the stakes at issue, the incentives for the majority party to
supervise assiduously the process by which money is allocated are
strong. Hence, the intra-Congressional structure of policymaking
delegation and control works as effectively in the appropriations process
as in the authorization process.
3. Transparencyand ConsensualDecisionmaking
The Court objects to the appropriations process on grounds that the
appropriations process is insufficiently transparent. This criticism, too,
118.
See Cox & MCCUBBINS, DELEGATION, supra note 99, at 245-47 (discussing
the role the Speaker plays in allocating plenary time).

is flawed. The creation of the budget is at least as transparent as any
other legislation, and probably more so. As described earlier, the process
begins more than a year and a half before appropriations legislation is
crafted with reports by the General Accounting Office and estimates
from executive agencies.19 Then, 12 months before the legislation hits
the floor, the Office of Management and Budget produces its budget
review. All of these documents are public and easily accessible to those
who want to be informed during the process. This is unlike regular
legislation where there is no public release requirement for staff and
committee reports until 48 hours before the vote. Committee reports are
required by congressional rules as a way to inform other members about
the committee's findings. Importantly, these committee reports can be
trusted because their authors meet the conditions for trust,

20

due either

to sharing similar interests with other members of Congress, or more
importantly, because the majority party requires committee chairs to
meet certain standards to gain and retain their positions.' 2 ' The quantity
of information available to the public, media, political opponents and
interested bystanders is far greater during the appropriations process
than the authorization process, which gives appropriations an advantage
regarding transparency.
The deliberation argument for the appropriations canon rests, as well,
on the view that the appropriations process does not lend itself to
consensual policymaking.'22 This, too, reflects a misunderstanding about
the contemporary Congress. The appropriations process is at least as
consensual as other legislative processes for two major reasons: First,
the significant degree of representation and high level of transparency
during the appropriations process increases the opportunities for
consensus to develop. The bargaining game between the president and
Congress during appropriations also provides opportunity for interbranch consensus to develop.'23 Second, appropriations bills typically
119.
For a general discussion, see Robert Keith, "A Brief Introduction to the
Federal Budget Process," CRS Report for Congress (Nov. 13, 1996), at http://www.
house.gov/rules/96-912.htm; Bill Heniff, Jr., "Overview of the Executive Budget Process,"
CRS Report for Congress (July 28, 2003), at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/
pdf/RS20175.pdf.
120.
See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIc DILEMMA, supra note 88, at 39-67,
210-15 (discussing the conditions for trust).
121.
See Cox & McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, supra note 109, ch. 8 (discussing

how the majority party controls committee chairs).
122.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
123.
See, e.g., D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Appropriations
Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress, 10(2)

LEGIS. STUD. Q. 183 (1985).
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pass with a considerable majority of the vote. 124 Indeed, the Appropriations
125
Committee has the lowest average dissent rate of House committees.
As Andrew Taylor noted, "[i]n a House increasingly riven by open
warfare, the Appropriations Committee has tried to be an oasis of
bipartisanship. When a committee is charged with enacting 13 bills each
year that are necessary to keep the government operating, good relationships
are a big help."12' 6 This is the best evidence that there is widespread
consensus in the legislative process during the appropriations process.
Apropos of the representation objection discussed above, this broad
support reflects the variety of avenues for prior participation in the
process.
To be sure, the appropriations process involves difficult struggles.
The stakes, after all, are high, with decisions involving fundamental
issues of resource allocation and policy control. To expect appropriations
lawmaking to be unanimous ignores the reality of policymaking, in
which a majority party must be able to pass legislation to fund and direct
the government's functions. To deny this role for appropriations would
be to reject majority rule decision making in the U.S. Congress.
The Court in TVA further argues that the appropriations process is not
as reasoned as the authorization process. By this, the Court presumably
means that legislators spend inadequate time and attention on the key
issues underlying their substantive decisions to change the authorizing
legislation.
This conclusion is hard to sustain in the face of an
understanding of the legislative process. The appropriations process is,
under the requirements of the federal budgetary process, the mechanism
by which the legislature makes fundamental and retail decisions about
the allocation of discretionary federal money in a fiscal year. 27 Richard
Fenno writes that "the Committee on Appropriations, far from being
merely one among many units in a complicated legislative-executive
system, is the most important, most responsible unit in the whole

124.
Final passage votes on adoption of a bill or a conference report for
appropriations legislation pass with the support of an average of 80% of votes cast. Data
from David W. Rohde, Roll Call Voting Data for the United States House of
Representatives, 1953-2000. Compiled by the Political Institutions and Public Choice
Program, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 2003.
125.
See Cox & McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, supra note 109, at 286.
126.
Andrew Taylor, House AppropriatorsShow Pastis not Prologue,CONG. Q. WKLY.
1732 (July 17, 2004).
127.
See generally ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING,
AND TAXING (1980).

'
appropriations process."128
Much of the federal budget is tied up with
automatic appropriations and so-called entitlement spending.129 Nonetheless,
there remains enough money left over to generate room for vigorous
conflict and competition.13 ° In any fiscal year, the choices concerning
appropriations are perhaps the most difficult and contested choices the
Congress faces in its carrying out of governmental responsibilities. As
demonstrated earlier, the appropriations process is a lengthy process that
allows significant time for the airing of all manner of arguments for and
against different types of spending. Although appropriations bills are
often brought up late in the session and may receive little plenary time,
this is because of the time spent on the bill before it ever reaches the
floor (including actions starting over a year and a half before final
passage). Consequently, a considerable amount of the work is done
before the bill reaches the floor. Equating plenary time with total time
spent on the legislation misconstrues the nature of the legislative
process.
The authorization process also has a considerable advantage in providing
opportunities for reasoned legislation, because policy goals can be
weighed against each other using spending and cost-benefit analysis as a
metric and a tool, respectively. There are two dimensions of legislating
through appropriations which suggest that Congress may be in a good
position to assess the utility of legislative change within this process.
The first is what we will call the horizontaldimension of legislative decision
making. Within the appropriations process, legislators may evaluate the
wisdom of statutory adjustments in light of other policy priorities. For
instance, the view of the fiscal consequences of a specific policy may be
affected greatly by the tradeoffs immanent in the current overall policy
domain. What may be sensible in terms of appropriations in one fiscal
year may be nonsensical in another, given the resource tradeoffs and
policy consequences at issue.
The Seattle Audubon situation provides a good example of how these
tradeoffs are considered. Congress had enacted a series of far-reaching
environmental laws in the early and mid-1970's.13 1 These laws, including

128.
Richard F. Fenno, Jr. The House Appropriations Committee as a Political
System: The Problem ofIntegration, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 310-24 (June 1962).
129.
In 2004 discretionary spending accounted for 35.9% of the U.S. federal budget
and in 1965 discretionary spending accounted for 61.5% of spending. However, the 2004
discretionary spending amounted to over $800 billion. See WALTER J. OLESZEK,
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 46 (2004).

130.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, The CongressionalBudget Process: Diagnosis,
Prescription,Prognosis, in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING: POLITICS, PROCESS, AND POWER
190 (W. Wander eds., 1984).
131.
Environmental legislation passed during this time period includes: National
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the ESA, restricted significantly harvesting and sale of timber from oldgrowth forests. Needless to say, these restrictions were controversial at
the time of the enactment of these statutes. And, as the economy of the
Pacific Northwest stagnated in the period of the late 1970's onward, the
impact of these laws on the timber industry and, thus, on the economy of
the region exacerbated this controversy. Attentive to these competing
concerns, Congress mapped out a compromise-labeled, appropriately, the
Northwest Timber Compromise-which endeavored to balance environmental
and economic interests. As described just above, this compromise was
forged within the appropriations process. By virtue of the annual
appropriations process, members of Congress could assess, with the
benefit of 17-years worth of experience with the ESA and its impacts,
the circumstances involved in this controversy. Through the constitutionally
prescribed lawmaking process, Congress could make an educated judgment
concerning the question of whether or not the twin values of environmental
protection and economic well-being are best protected through a
resolute, unyielding application of the ESA and its concomitant regulations
or whether there are sound reasons to limit, at least for a time, the impact
of the spotted owl regulations on the Northwest timber industry. We
take no position on the underlying resolution; these tradeoffs are
difficult to assess. Our point, rather, is that Congress is in an excellent
position to assess the efficacy of its policy architecture when it considers
annual appropriations, indeed, a better position than it is when it makes
initial, broad authorization judgments. Reconfiguring this architecture
in the focused crucible of resource allocation decision making is a
superior way of making difficult policy choices. Such choices, after all,
usually involve difficult tradeoffs. And it is a fundamental precept of
such decision making that more information is better than less when
these choices are made.
Viewed in one light, Congress may always consider these policy
tradeoffs with regard to the contemporary structure of federal legislation.
Yet, the appropriations process demands such examination of tradeoffs;
indeed, this is part and parcel of what is the appropriations process, that
is, the consideration of the overall scope of federal public policy. We
might, therefore, pay special heed to what Congress decides with regard

Environmental Policy Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act,
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act,
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Safe Drinking Water Act and the Toxic
Substance Act.

to such tradeoffs in the appropriations process.
The other dimension of policymaking is what we call the temporal
dimension of legislative decision making. The idea here is that the
legislature considers, within the structure of the appropriations process,
policies within the shadow of what has transpired before. That is,
Congress considers, in deciding at what level to fund a particular
governmental program, the past successes and failures of the program.
It has a vantage point resulting from the time that has passed.
Legislation is, after all, frequently an experiment. The legislature endeavors
to tackle a public program through the enactment of legislation, while
reserving the discretion to change course at a later point in time.
Legislative changes subsequent to the original enactment are to be
encouraged; they represent legislative appreciation of the role of changed
circumstances (or, in some instances, changed politics). Legislative
changes through the appropriations process may well ease these changes;
they enable Congress to limit the scope and reach of a legislative policy
without dismantling the policy altogether; they permit a greater range of
discretion by providing a more finely tuned instrument of revision and
change. Congress may ultimately turn to substantive and substantial
legislative modifications or perhaps even rescission of the statutory
policy; yet, changes via appropriations may reveal a more carefully
considered policy choice by Congress. Discouraging such tempering
strategies through a restrictive approach to appropriations limits this fine
tuning, and thereby leaves Congress with a more limited range of
policymaking tools.
By contrast, the authorization process does not provide the same
effective method for legislators to weigh various policy options against
each other. Authorizing legislation comes up seriatim, and Congress is
seldom attentive to the ways in which a particular statute impacts upon
fundamental resource allocation decisions wrought by earlier statutes
and by statutes whose consideration lies in the future. To be sure,
Congress can take into account the holistic fiscal consequences of their
actions when they consider any legislative proposal. Our point is that
neither the incentives nor the structure of Congress gives reason to
believe that legislators will in fact do so.
The lack of tradeoffs can be seen in major authorizing legislation. A
recent example of the non-reasoned nature of authorizing legislation
comes from the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act, in which Congress introduced
new corporate governance procedures.' 3 2 This legislation was rushed
132.

Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate

Governance, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper 04-032 (Sept. 25, 2004) (on file
with author).
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through Congress in response to high-profile corporate fraud at Enron
and Worldcom, and during the legislative process little time was given
to the policy positions of competing interest groups. In fact, Roberta
Romano writes: "Simply put, the corporate governance provisions were
'
not a focus of deliberation by Congress."133
There are theoretical and
practical reasons to doubt that the authorization process has a comparative
advantage on the appropriations process with regards to its reasoned
nature.
C. Summary
The preceding sections have shown that there is little substance to the
Court's objections to the appropriations process on deliberation grounds.
Much of what the Court concludes is based on a misunderstanding of
both the authorization and appropriations process. The conventional
view of the legislative appropriations process is a peculiar brand of
tunnel vision, where one sees only the end of a long tunnel, the point at
which appropriations are brought to the floor. The Court's view is that
legislators gather together their political tactics and construct policy
agendas through a weakly deliberative process of fiscal wheeling and
dealing. This depiction is set in contrast to the processes of legislating
in ordinary, non-appropriations contexts.
The notion that the legislature deliberates effectively through the
ordinary legislative process and then scrupulously departs from such
optimal deliberation when it turns to appropriations is inaccurate. Ordinary
legislating consists of a mixture of strategies, agenda manipulation,
and good-faith policy formation. The constraints of time, as well as
ubiquitous constituent pressures, exist in any context in which the
legislature acts, whether deemed "ordinary" or "extraordinary." The concept
of deliberation is a notoriously slippery one; yet, however we may
conceptualize deliberation, the fact of legislating in traditional settings is
a complex, interdependent, and particularistic one.
Viewed through the lens of congressional structure and practice, the
deliberative ideal is better fulfilled through active legislating through the
appropriations process. As we suggested above, the deliberative ideal is
a controversial one, for not only is this ideal contestable as a normative
matter,1 34 but it is questionable as a matter of constitutional theory and

133.
134.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 88.

law. 135 However, insofar as deliberative policy processes are favored as
the best way to make decisions, we have offered some reasons to reject
the appropriations canon and, moreover, some reasons why there might
be reasons to favor an opposite canon, that is, one in which statutory
repeals or revisions through the appropriations process ought to be
looked at especially charitably. Indeed, Article 1, Section 9 specifically
mentions appropriations as a key responsibility of Congress.
The fact that the courts in TVA, Robertson, and other cases have
misconceived the legislative process and, as a consequence, have gotten
their process-perfecting canon backwards suggests a broader lesson
about the perils of canonical construction. We consider these lessons in
the concluding section of this article.
IV. LESSONS FOR CANONICAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

A. CanonicalConstruction Should be Based Upon a Normative
Compelling View of Law and the Legislative Process
13 6
Substantive canons are designed to implement substantive values.
Therefore, the measure of a successful canon is whether it improves the
state of the world through its use. This is not, we hasten to add, the sole
criterion of legitimacy; as we discuss below, the enterprise of canonical
construction rests on a disputed view of the role of the courts in statutory
interpretation. Yet, if we stipulate that the overall objective of substantive
canonical construction is adequately justified, we must still press the
point of whether and to what extent particular canons improve the
lawmaking process.137

135.
136.

See supra text accompanying notes 99.
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in StatutoryInterpretation,

137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
Moreover, insofar as these judgments are grounded in assumptions about the
137.
legislative process, it is imperative that the canons and their deployment be based upon
reasonable assumptions. In the case of the appropriations canon, we explained why
these assumptions were unreasonable; indeed, a more accurate perspective on the
legislative process may lead on to the adoption of the opposite canon, that is, that
legislative changes through the appropriations process are to be especially favored. Yet,
we can see this same flaw in the courts' contemporary approach to other interpretive
canons as well.
Consider, for example, the courts' use of the canon which undergirds the appropriations
rule, namely, the canon that repeals by implication are disfavored, see TVA, 437 U.S. at
153. The assumption underlying this canon is that Congress manifests its intentions only
directly, through explicit instructions. Thus, when it purports to change a statutory
provision it does not clearly; where it is not clear, so the argument goes, we can assume
that Congress intended to leave well enough alone. This is the essential logic of the
canon that repeals by implication are disfavored. However, we know that Congress acts
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The measure of process improvement is viewed as the expansion of
deliberation in legislative decisionmaking. The restrictive approach to
legislative change through the appropriations canon is justified on the
grounds that such an approach facilitates legislative deliberation. Thus
justified, this canon, for reasons we describe above, rests on a quite
controversial normative view about the nature of legislative deliberation.
This view, elegantly articulated by leading political theorists and legal
38
scholars, is that legislatures should aspire to be much more deliberative.'
This aspiration, they argue, reflects the larger ambitions of the founders
and of contemporary political theory, generally, to foment intra-legislative
deliberation. 3 9 Deliberative democracy in representative government is
attractive both for the better ends that are reached through this process
and for its intrinsic value under a "proceduralist" conception of democratic
decision making. 4 ° Though the question of whether this is an attractive
point of view is mostly beyond the scope of this article, we do note that
the tether between the appropriations canon and this deliberative
conception of congressional lawmaking rests on a quite controversial
series of normative assumptions. What does deliberation mean in the
modem Congress? Are 535 legislators capable of the sort of deliberative
implicitly with regard to legislative actions in many contexts. And the courts not only
concede this, but in fact base other interpretive canons on this logic. For instance, the
cases in which the courts imply a private right of action in a statute reflect the courts'
judgment that Congress intended to provide a private right of action in a regulatory
statute and that this intention will be respected in the absence of a clear statement. See,
e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
By contrast, the logic of the "repeals by implication" canon supposes that Congress
never repeals a statute by implication; rather, it only enacts a statute thereby. In addition
to the faulty logic underlying this view, the canon rests on a misguided assumption about
the nature of the legislative process. It conceives of Congress as an institution that is
insistent in its protection of the status quo and its privileging of extant legislation;
however, we know from careful observation and also from the positive political theory of
the legislative process that Congress commonly retreats from previous policy decisions
and that it does so through a variety of tried-and-true devices, including administrative
agency oversight, official repeal of regulations, restrictions on regulatory funding,
scrutiny of agency officials in confirmation hearings, and, yes, substantive changes
through the appropriations process. In light of these ubiquitous instruments of policy
control, it is naive to suppose that Congress would not intend to repeal a statute by
implication. This is, therefore, an illustration of the courts' flawed canonical construction, an
approach which builds on flimsy assumptions about the legislative process.
138.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
139.
See sources cited in supra note 77.
See id.
140.

democracy that deliberation theorists celebrate? Does the U.S. Constitution
contemplate, expect, or even permit the deliberative ideal that these
scholars commend? How do we reconcile the values of deliberation
with other critical values which are ascribed to Congress in practice and
in theory, for example, checks and balances, constituent representation,
majority rule, party influence, and agenda control. These and other
questions are properly put to scholars and courts who insist that the
measure of certain process-perfecting canons is the success that
canonical construction enjoys in promoting deliberation within Congress.
The more general point is that arguments for a particular method of
canonical construction must be grounded squarely in persuasive
prescriptive analysis. It is not sufficient to insist that substantive canons
promote one or more substantive values; we must be persuaded that
these values are worthy of promotion.' 4 ' In the case of deliberationpromoting strategies, we insist that this case is insufficiently supported.
And whether and to what extent this particular canon furthers other
substantive aims is nowhere apparent in the courts' analysis of the
canon, its underpinnings, and its effects. Much the same can be said about
the other so-called substantive canons of statutory construction. The
prescriptive arguments for canonical construction in the modem statutory
interpretation debate are weak; too often, they simply assume that there
are values associated with promoting one or another substantive aim
through a judicial thumb on the interpretive scale. These assumptions
must be defended with analysis; and this analysis must support clearly
and rigorously the difficult case for replacing legislative will and
statutory text with a preferred policy or a salutary lawmaking process.

141.
Lest one think that this flaw in the courts' approach to canonical construction
is of recent origin, we recall the earliest canons, those associated with William

Blackstone and the approach of the English common law courts. These canons, too,
rested on controversial and frequently undefended normative assumptions. Perhaps the
earliest major canon was Blackstone's injunction that "statutes in derogation of the
common law be narrowly construed." See ESKRIDGE, ET AL, LEGISLATION, supra note 76,
at 898; Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565 (1879). Of course, this canon
rested on the Blackstonian view that the common law ought to be favored as a method of
lawmaking and that legislation should be interstitial and rare. This canon rested on a
shaky normative foundation at the time; after all, Bentham and his contemporaries fueled
the move in England in, more methodically, on the continent, toward statute-making by
elected legislators. See generally DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION
DETERMINED 16-20, 52-72 (1989). Not coincidentally, Blackstone propounded
the "derogation" canon just as the expansion of statutes made the assumption that

legislative lawmaking was of modest consequence and scope anachronistic.
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B.

CanonicalConstruction Must be Attentive to the Equilibrium
Effects of Legal Rules andJudicialDecisions

One of the cardinal contributions of positive political theory has been
the observation, based upon both rigorous theory and evidence, that
decisions reached by courts, legislatures, and agencies-indeed, all
relevant political actors-impact the strategic decisions of other actors in
the political process.' 42 In the vernacular of standard noncooperative game
theory, political actors make decisions in light of anticipated actions of
other decisionmakers equipped with (this is the simplifying assumption)
full information.'4 3 As Brian Marks and many others have explained,
statutory decisions are not final; Congress can and does adapt to these
decisions through various techniques, most notably, its constitutional
power under Article I, Section 7 to overturn statutory interpretations
through legislation.' 44 Moreover, there are a variety of devices Congress,
145
and also the President, can and do use to influence judicial decisions.
There are, as scholars in this tradition have explained, multiple
equilibria possible within the Congress/courts/agency process. 146 Whether
one or another equilibrium obtains, and the durability of that equilibrium
in light of the dynamics of the inter-institutional process, is both a
theoretical and an empirical question; yet, we can extrapolate from the
configuration of political interests, ideological commitments, economic
circumstances (i.e. transaction costs, scarcity, resource endowments,
etc.), and, importantly, the nature, scope and limits of human cognition,
what courts and Congress may do in one or another decision making
situation.' 4 7
142.
For an overview of the vast literature on this point, see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK
S. BoNCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS (1997).
143.
See generally DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH & JEFFREY S. BANKS, POSITIVE POLITICAL
THEORY 11 (2005).
144. See Brian Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence of Congressional Policy
Making: Grove City College v. Bell (Hoover Institution Working Paper, 1988). See also
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 70; Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice
Theory of Supreme Court Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City
Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990).
145.
For a general discussion, see WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT:
A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT,
CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1960 (1961); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
146. See generally KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING
POLITICS 422-28 (1997).
147.
See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 88, at 205-27.

Canonical construction, by its very design, aims to shift onto Congress
the burden and costs of making a particular legislative decision.148 So,
in the case of the appropriations canon, Congress may repeal a previous
statute, but, to do so, it must be explicit about what it is doing-indeed,
not only explicit, but explicit to the satisfaction of the court. By all
accounts, this requirement is designed to make it more difficult for
Congress to legislate through the appropriations process. However, the
assumption that Congress will, when faced with these costs, abandon its
efforts to effect a particular policy change, is naive and unsupportable.
More reasonable is the view that Congress will review the policymaking
options available to it and revise its strategies in light of the burdens
imposed by the court through this canon.
To be sure, Congress may find itself without reasonable options. The
court, through the deployment of a canon, may truly curtail congressional
action, in which case the substantive result favored by the court is set
more or less in stone (at least until the court changes its mind). More
often, we believe, Congress can reengineer its policy approach to pursue
its objectives through other means. For example, if a court enforces
rigidly the appropriations canon, making it rather difficult to effect a
change to an earlier statute, Congress may expand its control over
agencies and agency budgets in order to get to the same result. As an
instrument of Congress, agencies can be steered in deliberate directions;
agency action at the behest of Congress may, after all, create conflict
between, say, Congress and the President, conflict that makes this
strategy problematic and costly. However, Congress's willingness/ eagerness
to exercise this option will likely be impacted by the availability of other
strategies. Thus, the use of a particular canon may shift the equilibrium
from a place in which Congress acts through the appropriations process
to effect legislative changes to an equilibrium in which the legislature's
preferred result is reached more indirectly through, for example,
command and control of agencies and agency implementation process.
To take a more concrete example, consider how Congress responded
149
to the Supreme Court's ruling that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional.
In the 1970's, the legislative veto (i.e. a statutory mechanism that makes
the administrative process subject to further legislative review or control)
became a popular way for Congress to gain greater oversight of agency
decisions and actions.15 ° Legislative veto provisions were attached to
148.
See the discussion in Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability:
A Study in CanonicalConstruction and its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1992).
149.
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
150.
See, e.g., Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 92-103 (1981);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
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many pieces of federal legislation (defense and foreign policy laws, in
particular).15 1 When, in 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that legislative
vetoes are unconstitutional, many claimed that Congressional power to
oversee agencies would be greatly reduced. However, far from reducing
Congress' power, the Court's ruling had two important effects: First,
Congress and agencies simply ignored the Court's ruling and continued
to issue and abide by legislative vetoes. 5 ' Second, Congress began 1to
153 and Leahy 54
rely on other oversight mechanisms. Indeed, as Kaiser
note, even absent the legislative veto, Congress has many oversight
mechanisms available to it, including 1) passing legislation to override
an agency's proposed action; 2) amending an agency's jurisdiction or
directly limiting its discretion; 3) requiring an agency to receive notice
before it takes any action; 4) imposing restrictions on the use of
appropriated funds; and 5) passing joint resolutions of disapproval.
Given the wide array of other mechanisms available to Congress, it is no
wonder that William Leahy concluded that "Chadha invalidates the use
of the [legislative] veto, but does nothing to impair these ' 55
other, clearly
constitutional, means of exerting congressional influence."'
Ought we to care about which equilibrium obtains? We answer yes.
Appropriations, as we discussed in the Part III above, is a process which
must go through the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process. Though the
contrast is drawn in TVA, Robertson, and elsewhere with "ordinary"
lawmaking, appropriations is, in constitutional terms, as ordinary as any
other lawmaking in that it complies with all the requirements of Article
I, Section 7. Insofar as legislative lawmaking ought, to the extent
possible, proceed consistently with what the Constitution decrees to be
the standard lawmaking process, the appropriations process fits this bill.
Moreover, Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution explicitly authorizes
Congress to pass appropriations bills, and these bills are one of only two
types of bills that the Constitution specifically mentions (the other is
revenue bills). We hasten to add that our point here is not merely the
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 496 (1988).
151.
See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, LEGISLATION, supra note 150, at 496.
152. See generally FISHER, SHARED POWER, supra note 150.
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See Kaiser, CongressionalControl of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of the

Chadha Decision, 36 AD L. REV. 239 (1984).
154. Leahy, William F, Recent Developments in Administrative Law: Congressional
Supervision ofAgency Action: The Fate Of the Legislative Veto After Chadha, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 168 (1984).

155.

Id. at 190.

formulaic one that appropriations is good because it is grounded in the
words and structure of Article I. To be clear about our normative views:
We believe that the constitutional structure of lawmaking rests on the
consent that citizens give to the government to develop public policy.
Though American political institutions obviously make policy through a
vast, complex web of techniques and tactics, we should not forget that
the core mechanism for the making of federal policy through representative,
transparent, and ultimately democratic techniques is legislative lawmaking
per Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution.
By contrast, pushing Congress toward policy changes through control
over agencies pushes policymaking out of the democratic arena of
Article I, Section 7 to the comparatively less democratic processes of
agency decisionmaking. All things being equal, this shift from one to
another equilibrium ought to give pause to those who believe that
canonical construction is process perfecting and that courts can have
their way by interpretive fiat.
We have drawn our conclusion from a discussion of the appropriations
canon. Yet, the observation about the equilibrium effects of canonical
construction is a more general one. Whenever courts apply an interpretive
rule directed at Congress, Congress can and will adapt to meet the new
circumstances created by the courts. Hence, in assessing the benefits
and costs of an interpretive rule, we must have a more sophisticated
sense of the equilibrium effects wrought by the courts approach. The
discussion of the particular canon on which we focus suggests that the
consequences of canonical construction may be unanticipated; and the
cure may be worse than the disease.
V. CONCLUSION

The appropriations canon rests on a deeply flawed description of the
federal lawmaking process. While the Supreme Court has viewed with
skepticism the appropriations process on the grounds that it is hectic,
opaque, and nondeliberative, we believe that this perception is misguided.
Indeed, the Court may have it backwards; the structure of the appropriations
process and the incentives faced by legislators making the contentious,
controversial budgetary decisions within this process points toward a
conclusion at odds with the appropriations canon.
Our analysis of this particular canon sheds light on the larger enterprise of
canonical construction. When courts create substantive canons, they are
promoting policy outcomes in the shadow of assessments about how
legislators behave and how statutes are enacted. This assessment must
be based upon a plausible theory of the legislative process; and the
canon must be evaluated in light of its impact on the legislative
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decisionmaking, and not merely on the basis of the substantive outcomes
reached in particular cases.
The growing interest in canons of statutory construction reflects, we
suggest, the tendency in the modem normative literature on statutory
interpretation to justify statutory revisionism. Whatever the case to be
made for this approach to interpreting statutes-an approach we argue
elsewhere is flawed-the retail approach to reconfiguring the legislative
process through tactical use of canons has its own liabilities. These
liabilities are well illustrated by the careless use of the appropriations
canon.

